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Abstract
For an intelligent agent to be truly autonomous,
it must be able to adapt its representation to the
requirements of its task as it interacts with the world.
Most current approaches to on-line feature extraction
are ad hoc; in contrast, this paper presents an
algorithm that bases judgments of state compatibility
and state-space abstraction on principled criteria
derived from the psychological principle of cognitive
economy. The algorithm incorporates an active
form of Q-learning, and partitions continuous state-
spaces by merging and splitting Voronoi regions.
The experiments illustrate a new methodology for
testing and comparing representations by means of
learning curves. Results from the puck-on-a-hill task
demonstrate the algorithm’s ability to learn effective
representations, superior to those produced by some
other, well-known, methods.
1 Introduction
Representation is the foundation for problem-solving:
it provides the vocabulary and populates the world
that we seek to understand and control. Although
we can sometimes specify a good representation for
particular problems, we have not understood the
general learning problem until we understand how
the representation can be learned along with the
behaviors that lead to success in a task. There
are also important practical reasons for studying
autonomous representation learning. For example,
success may depend on the agent’s ability to learn
an effective representation from scratch if the task is
poorly understood, or if there are too many possible
scenarios for us to work out a complete specification
of the state-space in advance. Even when it would
be possible to design the representation beforehand,
it might not be a cost-effective use of programmer
time, especially if the representation will later need
to be updated as the task environment changes.
This paper presents a new approach to the problem
of autonomous representation learning, by applying
the psychological principle of cognitive economy [19]
to the domain of reinforcement learning [11, 21].
1.1 Effective representations
One of the hard problems facing any theory of
cognition is that of finding principled ways of speci-
fying when states of the world are “the same” and
when they must be distinguished. Distinguishing
every possible state of the world from every other
state makes learning intractable except in very small,
discrete state-spaces; but the agent cannot learn the
task if the representation groups together states of
the world that require different behaviors. Ideally,
the agent should learn which states must be distin-
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guished, while avoiding irrelevant distinctions that
prevent it from generalizing its learning over states
that are “the same kind of thing” in its task. How can
an agent learn such a representation without knowing
about the task beforehand?
1.2 Function approximation and value
prediction
The typical approach to reinforcement learning rep-
resents the agent’s knowledge of the world in terms of
an action-value function, Q(s, a). This function gives
the long-term estimate of reward that results from
taking action a from state s, and following a greedy
policy thereafter (that is, the agent chooses the
action with the highest value in all subsequent states)
[22, 21]. The original descriptions of Q-learning
assumed a discrete representation: the action-value
function was assumed to be stored as a table having
a separate row for the values of each distinct state
[22]. To extend the approach to large and continuous
state-spaces, we may store the values Q(s, a) more
compactly as a parameterized function of s and a;
the learning problem then becomes an exercise in
function approximation, where the agent responds
to its experiences in the world by adding features
or tuning parameters so that it minimizes the mean-
squared error (MSE) in the value predictions, Q(s, a).
Sutton and Barto comment that “our ultimate pur-
pose is to use the predictions to aid in finding a
better policy. The best predictions for that purpose
are not necessarily the best for minimizing the MSE.
However, it is not yet clear what a more useful
alternative goal for value prediction might be,” [21,
p. 196].
This paper presents an alternative goal for value
prediction, based on the insight that some Q-value
errors will have no effect on the agent’s ability to
perform its task. The agent learns faster when it can
generalize over “similar” states: states that agree on
the preferred action and expectation of reward. Be-
cause similar states may differ on the expected values
of non-preferred actions, grouping these states may
increase the overall prediction error—even though
these differences do not impact the agent’s perfor-
mance in the task. In contrast, some states should
be considered incompatible because ignoring their
differences leads the agent to make bad decisions;
such states must not be grouped together. This
paper presents principled criteria for deciding when
the differences matter and when they may be ignored.
1.3 Feature extraction and state ab-
straction
Assume a representational model in which the value
function Q is written in terms of a weighted set of
feature detectors:
Q(s, aj) =
∑
i
wijfi(s)
This model characterizes much of the work on func-
tion approximation [21, Ch 8]. For example, we
can describe a partition representation by defining
a feature fi for each state-space region Si, such
that fi(s) = 1 for s ∈ Si and fi(s) = 0 for all
all other states s. This same model encompasses
discrete (“look-up table”) representations, partition
representations, tiled representations (such as CMAC
[1]), perceptrons, and radial-basis function networks,
depending on the definition of the {fi}.
The features and the state-space regions lead to
complementary ways of looking at the same function
approximation process. We see that the function
fi is a rule (intension) describing a set Si of states
(extension) that are grouped together. We may
define the state-space groupings in terms of the
features, or equivalently, we may define the features
in terms of the groupings. When the features {fi} are
continuous-valued, the corresponding state groupings
{Si} will be fuzzy sets. If we think of the state
groupings as determining the feature detectors, we
can think of the Si as “generalized states,” which
determine how action values are stored—just as the
individual states do in the discrete representation.
This duality of features and state-space grouping is
important because the grouping of states is the key
concept for deciding which Q-value differences matter
in the agent’s task. When we consider function
approximation without discerning the role played by
state abstraction, it becomes difficult to determine
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how the differences affect the agent’s ability to choose
the correct behavior at each state.
1.4 Ad hoc approaches to state ab-
straction
One approach to representation is to continue to sub-
divide the state-space until its resolution is adequate
to distinguish states that are not “the same kind
of situation.” Ideally, the representation will make
finer distinctions in parts of the space where the
differences matter, and simplify the representation
of other areas. In other words, the representation
should have a resolution that varies throughout the
state-space according to the demands of the task.
Function approximation methods that simply cluster
the task inputs cannot provide this kind of represen-
tation because they are blind with respect to the task
requirements. Although we can sometimes specify
important areas of the state-space for particular
tasks, it is hard to do so in a general way.
For example, [10] assumed that states closest to
the initial state required the finest resolution; [14]
assumed that states closest to paths taken by the
agent through the state-space were most important;
[8] assumed that the most frequently-seen areas of
state-space were most important. These criteria
led to effective representations for the tasks being
studied, but we can readily imagine tasks in which
these criteria are irrelevant. We need representa-
tional criteria that explain why—and when—these
strategies identify state-space differences that are
relevant to the agent’s task. The key is to define im-
portant differences in terms of more general criteria
for representational adequacy.
1.5 Cognitive economy
Cognitive economy generally refers to the combined
simplicity and relevance of a categorization scheme
or representation. Natural intelligences appear to
adopt categorizations with high cognitive economy
in order to make sense of the sea of stimuli impinging
on their senses without overloading their bounded
cognitive resources. Under the heading Cognitive
Economy, Eleanor Rosch writes of the “common-
sense notion” that the function of categorization is
to “provide maximum information with the least
cognitive effort,” “conserving finite resources as much
as possible” [19, p. 28]. Then she writes (p. 29):
. . . one purpose of categorization is to reduce
the infinite differences among stimuli to
behaviorally and cognitively usable propor-
tions. It is to the organism’s advantage
not to differentiate one stimulus from others
when that differentiation is irrelevant to the
purposes at hand.
Cognitive economy results when the representation
makes task-relevant distinctions while ignoring irrel-
evant information. This form of selective general-
ization presents the agent with a simpler working
environment for its task. To apply this principle
to reinforcement learning, we must define criteria
for relevant distinctions without appealing to any
task-specific information. This paper defines relevant
distinctions in terms of the amount of reward that the
agent stands to lose by ignoring them. The resulting
criteria characterize state-space distinctions that are
important for the agent to maximize its reward in
the task. In this way, the task’s reward function
determines relevance in the agent’s world.
2 Representational criteria
Given a pair of states, s1 and s2, we want to
know whether the agent may safely group them
together so that they share action values—will this
state generalization cause the agent to lose reward?
One way to find out is to consider the two states
separately, comparing the expectation of reward for
actions taken from s1 with the expectations from
s2. For example, we can consider the sum of the
immediate reward given for taking action a from s1
and the value of the resulting state. In this way, we
push our dependence on the value predictions one
step into the future, and bypass any Q-value error
caused by inappropriate generalization of s1.We may
compare these “look-ahead” values with Q(s1, a) in
order to decide whether representational errors are
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compromising the agent’s ability to choose actions
that maximize its reward in the task. We may also
compare the look-ahead values for s1 and s2 in order
to judge whether they may safely be included in the
same “generalized state.” If not, the agent should
refine its representation so that it learns their action
values separately.
The next section presents a vocabulary for this
discussion. Specifically, it defines value functions
and action preference sets to be used in criteria for
representational adequacy and state compatibility.
2.1 Preference and value functions
Definition 1 (Action value)
Q(s, aj) =
∑
i
wijfi(s)
This is the same definition given earlier, restated here
for convenience.
Definition 2 (State value)
V (s) = max
j
Q(s, aj)
Thus V (s) represents the long-term reward given by
the best action available from s. This is the standard
definition of state value, given by [22, 21].
Definition 3 (Preferred action set)
prefǫ(s) = {aj : Q(s, aj) ≥ V (s)− ǫ}
The preferred action set contains the action or actions
that appear to maximize the agent’s expected reward.
Thus pref0(s) gives the action(s) with value V (s),
while taking ǫ > 0 makes the selection less stringent,
and causes the preference set to contain all actions
with value within ǫ of V (s).
The functions for our one-step look-ahead are
analogous to the definitions of Q, V, and prefǫ(s).
Definition 4 (Look-ahead action value, case 1)
Suppose that taking action a from state s always
results in the following transition:
s
a
−→ r, s′
Then we define
Q1(s, a) = r + γV (s′)
Like the function Q(s, a), Q1(s, a) represents the
expected discounted future reward when the agent
chooses action a from state s. The parameter γ is
the Q-learning discount for future rewards [22, 21].
This definition holds when the task rewards and state
transitions are deterministic.
Definition 5 (Look-ahead action value, case 2)
Q1(s, a) =
∑
s′
Pass′ [R
a
ss′ + γV (s
′)]
In many tasks the rewards and state transitions will
either be stochastic, or may appear stochastic simply
because of imperfect function approximation. In this
case, we need to modify Definition 4: we replace
the immediate reward r with its expected value,
Rass′ , and we consider all possible resulting states s
′,
weighted by their probability of occurrence, Pass′ .
Now we may define look-ahead versions of the state
value and preference functions by replacing use of the
value function Q with Q1.
Definition 6 (Look-ahead state value)
V 1(s) = max
j
Q1(s, aj)
Definition 7 (Look-ahead preferred action set)
pref1ǫ(s) = {aj : Q1(s, aj) ≥ V 1(s)− ǫ}
2.2 Representational adequacy
Definition 8 (ǫ-adequacy) Let δ be given, and as-
sume that the agent always selects an action from
prefδ(s). We will say that a representation of the
state-space is an ǫ-adequate representation for δ ≤
ǫ, if for every state s reachable by the agent, the
following two properties hold:
prefδ(s) ⊆ pref1ǫ(s) (1)
|V 1(s)− V (s)| ≤ ǫ (2)
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Meeting the ǫ-adequacy criterion guarantees that
the state generalization at s does not prevent the
agent from being able to learn the correct policy
at s or mislead the agent at an earlier state as to
the desirability of s. Thus, this criterion defines a
standard for representational accuracy at individual
states, guaranteeing that the harmful effects of state
generalization are kept in check and that the agent
can learn to make sound decisions.
This standard defines an adequate representation
as one that makes the distinctions needed for the
task to remain learnable. It characterizes relevant
distinctions in terms of the amount of reward that
the agent stands to lose by ignoring them. This
is the approach taken in [6], which introduces the
incremental regret of a representation at time t—the
amount of reward the agent loses when it groups
its current state, st, in some category S. A perfect
representation would have an incremental regret of 0
at each step, because the representation would allow
the agent to learn to distinguish the best action for
every state.
Non-zero incremental regret arises from two kinds
of representational error: grouping states that have
different policies, and grouping states that have very
different values. First, if the representation groups st
with the wrong states, the action that appears best
for the group, S, may be sub-optimal for st. This
could lead the agent to take the wrong action from
st. Second, if the value of st is very different from
the value of other states in S, the agent might not
recognize that arriving in st is a special opportunity
(or pitfall), because the action values are averaged
over all the states in S—not just st. This could cause
the agent to make the wrong choice from st−1. In both
cases, the agent makes wrong decisions, resulting in
lost reward in the task. The ǫ-adequacy criterion
limits the amount of lost reward by comparing the
policy and value predicted by function approximation
with the results of a one-step look-ahead. Thus the
actions that appear to have the best value for S must
be good actions for st (Equation 1, concerned with
policy distinctions), and the state value of st must be
close to that predicted by the information given for
the category S, (Equation 2, for value distinctions).
This bounds the incremental regret at st by ǫ.
The ǫ-adequacy criterion allows us to take a rep-
resentation for which the action values are known,
and test whether it makes the state-space distinctions
that are important for a particular task. If the action
values are still being learned, such judgments are
only provisional. It is useful to have an additional
criterion for state compatibility, if the agent is to learn
its representation along with the action values.
2.3 State compatibility
Although the ǫ-adequacy criterion provides an ob-
jective standard for an adequate representation—
one which allows the agent to learn its task—these
characteristics of the representation are really the
outcome of the particular distinctions the represen-
tation makes or fails to make between individual
states. In practice, it is often more useful to be
able to evaluate the compatibility of two states than
the compatibility of a state with a region, because a
poorly-chosen region could be incompatible with all
its member states. This can also happen with good
regions that simply have not had their action values
updated for a long while.
Thus we need to bridge the gap between the high-
level description of adequate representations and the
low-level decisions the agent must make as to which
states must be kept separate. In other words, when
must the representation distinguish states and when
may it generalize over states, in order for it to be
ǫ-adequate?
Definition 9 (State compatibility) Let δ be
given, and assume that the agent always selects an
action from prefδ(s). Assume that our goal is to
produce an ǫ-adequate representation, where ǫ ≥ δ.
We will say that states s1 and s2 are compatible
in case the following three conditions hold:
pref1ǫ(s1) = pref1ǫ(s2) (3)
|V 1(s1)− V 1(s2)| ≤ δ (4)
and
pref1δ(s1) = pref1δ(s2) if δ ≤ ǫ/2 (5)
pref10(s1) = pref10(s2) otherwise (6)
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The criteria consist of three rules. The first rule
ensures that the same actions appear desirable in
each state. The second rule requires that the values
of the states are close, based on a one-step look-
ahead. The purpose of the third rule (Equations 5
and 6) is to ensure that the action which appears to
be the best for a set of compatible states is, in fact,
a pretty good action for any of the states in the set.
This is difficult to guarantee when the compatibility
criteria are written for pairs of states, rather than
in terms of the whole set. That is why the criteria
demand equality of the preference sets instead of
merely requiring the preference sets to overlap. When
δ ≤ ǫ/2, the looser restriction of Equation 5 allows
the states to have slightly different values for the
top actions, making the criteria more suitable for a
practical algorithmwhich must account for real-world
noise in the value estimates. The cut-off value of ǫ/2
appears to come from the sum of the errors allowed
by combining Equation 4 with Equation 5.
These issues are worked out in [6], which also offers
a proof that for partition representations, separating
incompatible states according to Definition 9 guar-
antees ǫ-adequacy of the representation. Definition 9
thus describes criteria which are sufficient to produce
ǫ-adequate representations. The task of finding a set
of necessary and sufficient conditions remains future
work.
The representational criteria thus allow the system
to detect relevant distinctions while generalizing over
similar states. These criteria express the principle of
cognitive economy in terms of representational ade-
quacy and state compatibility. Since the criteria do
this by examining the values of the actions available
to the agent in its task, they allow feature extraction
to proceed without depending on any other task-
specific knowledge. In this sense, the approach is a
principled one, and a solution to the general problem
of representation learning by autonomous agents.
3 An Algorithm for On-Line
Feature Extraction
The representational criteria not only provide a basis
for understanding how accurately the action values
must be learned, but these criteria also provide the
means for analyzing and improving representations
for a particular task. The most challenging appli-
cation of these ideas is to learn the representation
along with the rest of the task, especially when the
system is forced to start from scratch, regarding
the task environment as a black box. Here success
depends on the integration of representation-learning
with the rest of the system. In particular, learning
the action values requires an adequate representa-
tion, yet the representational criteria depend on
the accuracy of the (partially-learned) action values.
Furthermore, changes made to the representation
may cause additional changes in the action values.
This section presents an online system that meets
these challenges as it learns its representation along
with the rest of the task. Although this system is just
one possible implementation of the ideas, its success
is an argument for the utility and robustness of the
representational criteria.
The algorithm combines Q-learning [22] with an
active strategy for remembering “surprising” states
and examining them at the ends of trials. When the
system’s current action leads to unexpected results,
it pushes the current state on a replacing-stack data
structure. (If the state belongs to the same region
as an earlier state on the stack, the earlier state
is removed). At the ends of trials, the system
conducts mini-trials from the states on its stack,
investigating the most recent surprising states first.
These investigations produce action-value profiles
which the system uses to update its action values,
and also to determine whether the representation
adequately represents the surprising states. If these
states are not compatible with the prototype states
for their regions, the system adjusts the state-space
representation accordingly. The key differences from
Q-learning are the use of the ǫ-adequacy criterion
(Definition 8) to detect surprising states, and use
of the state compatibility criterion (Definition 9) to
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decide when to separate two states. In addition, this
version of the algorithm sometimes selects starting
states for its experiments on the basis of its stack,
instead of always beginning at the same “start” state
and proceeding to a terminal state.
The state-abstraction section of the algorithm is
built upon a nearest-neighbor representation of the
state-space. The partition regions are the Voronoi
regions about each of a series of prototype states
given to the representation. (A Voronoi region is
the set of points closer to a particular prototype
than to the other prototypes). Some regions consist
of a single prototype and its Voronoi region, while
others are compound regions consisting of a set of
merged Voronoi regions. The compound regions are
represented by a primary prototype state; this state is
taken as the representative state for any of the states
which fall in that region, even though some other
state may be their nearest-neighbor prototype. If the
state to be classified lies within a simple, un-merged
region, its primary prototype will be the nearest-
neighbor. When a state is judged incompatible
with the prototype state for its region, we split the
region by simply adding the surprising state as a new
prototype; it then becomes the primary prototype of
a new Voronoi region in the space.
3.1 The top level of the algorithm
The top level of the algorithm is given in Figure 1.
It outlines the function get action, which is called
with the results of the transition
st−1
a
−→ r, st
This function updates the action values and then
calls a function to select the next action. The
action value update is only applied when the
new state, st, is considered reliable: the function
reliable source(k) is true when Updates(k, b) ≥
MIN UPDATES for some action b. Rather than look-
ing at the number of visits, this criterion determines
whether any of the action values for region k have
been updated a certain minimum number of times.
The value of MIN UPDATES was 3 for the experi-
ments reported here. Checking for experience in this
j ← region(st−1)
k ← region(st)
if terminal(st) or reliable source(k) then
if terminal(st) then
Qnew ← r
else
Qnew ← r + γmaxiQ(k, i)
Q(j, a)← (1 − α)Q(j, a) + αQnew
Updates(j, a)← Updates(j, a) + 1
if not ǫ-adequate(st−1)
or j has never been investigated
or a weighted coin flip returns heads
then push (st−1, j) on the stack
if terminal(st) then
process stack()
else
return next action()
Figure 1: get action(st−1, a, r, st)
way is an enhancement that could be applied to any
value iteration algorithm, and not essential to the
algorithm.
The ǫ-adequacy test done here to detect surprising
states is a simplification of the one defined in Defini-
tion 8; it uses the simpler, non-stochastic definition
of Q1 (Definition 4) to compare the recently experi-
enced transition with the action-value profile Q(j, ·).
Typically, a driver process invokes get action to
begin a trial from some start state, s0. During a trial,
the algorithm updates action values as Q-learning
would, and then chooses the next action according to
its current policy and action values. The algorithm
continues to process state transitions fed to it by the
driver, but may also initiate active exploration at the
end of trials by invoking process stack().
3.2 Active state investigations
Figure 2 outlines the function process stack(),
which investigates states that appeared “surprising.”
Because the stack is a last-in, first-out data structure,
process stack() explores states that occur at the
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while not empty( replacing-stack )
s← pop( replacing-stack )
j ← region(s)
if FE TIMER() then
update representation(s, j)
else
investigate(s)
for each a: if reliable(a) then
Updates(j, a) = Updates(j, a) + 1
Q(j, a)← Q(j, a)
+alpha(j, a)[Q1(s, a)−Q(j, a)]
Figure 2: process stack()
ends of episodes before it explores earlier states.
This property allows the system to focus on the
frontier between unlearned states and states whose
action values have already been grounded in the
reward given by the environment. Actions leading
to terminal states are learned first, then the action
values of states one step earlier. As the system
learns about states near the ends of trials, they stop
being surprising, and the system focuses its attention
on states which precede those states. In this way,
the action values are learned from the end states
backwards to the beginning states, but without all
the extra action-value backups from internal states
whose values have not yet been learned.
Because the stack is implemented as a replacing-
stack, pushing any item causes the stack to remove
any previous occurrence of that item before adding
the new one. To enable the system to cope with
continuous state-spaces, in which the same exact
state might never be repeated, the stack regards
states from the same region as “the same.” Therefore
pushing a state removes any other states having
the same region from the stack. This ensures that
the stack size does not grow without bound: the
number of items on the stack is limited by the number
of state-space regions in the representation, and a
particular region will not be explored more than once
for any session. These are desirable qualities for
cyclic tasks like the puck-on-a-hill task, because a
single region might otherwise fill the stack with states
seen during repeated passes through that region.
for each action a
sˆ← s
rˆ ← 0
steps = 0; discount = 1.0
repeat
sˆ
a
−→ r, s′
k ← region(s′)
rˆ ← rˆ + discount ∗ r
discount = γ ∗ discount
steps ← steps +1
sˆ← s′
until region(s′) 6= region(s) or
steps ≥ MAX STEPS or
terminal(s′)
reliable(a)← reliable source(k)
if terminal(s′) then
Q1(s, a)← rˆ
else
Q1(s, a)← rˆ + γmaxiQ(k, i)
Figure 3: investigate(s)
The system investigates a state by conducting a
mini-trial for each possible action from that state
(Figure 3). These trials only last long enough for
the agent’s state to enter another region or for it to
reach a terminal state. In the case of an action that
leads back to the same region, the investigation times
out after a certain number of steps. If a single action
takes the agent out of the region, the mini-trial stops
after one action.
Feature extraction is not performed after every
trial. If this investigation is not one in which the
system will perform feature extraction, the system
applies the results of its investigation by updating
action values according to the new profile. Like
the Q-learning updates done in the top level of the
algorithm, these updates only back up values when
the resulting states (from the investigations, in this
case) are determined to be reliable. Unlike those
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updates, the learning rate for the active updates
decreases with the number of times the action value
has been updated, until it hits a specified minimum
value (Figure 4).
if Updates(j, a) ≤ ENOUGH SAMPLES
return 1.0/Updates(j, a)
else
return 1.0/ENOUGH SAMPLES
Figure 4: alpha(j, a)
3.3 State abstraction module
sp ← primary prototype for s
sp2 ← nearest-neighbor prototype for s,
(if sp isn’t nearest)
investigate(s)
investigate(sp)
update Q(j, ·) by Q1(sp, ·)
if (should split(s, sp) = no)
or (reliable prototype(j) = no) then
update Q(j, ·) by Q1(s, ·)
else split j :
reduce reliability info for j
if sp2 exists then investigate(sp2)
if (should split(sp, sp2) = no)
or (should split(s, sp2) = yes) then
add s as a new prototype
if (should split(sp, sp2) = yes) then
detach sp2 from sp
if we did not add s as prototype
update sp2 with Q1(s, ·)
if MERGE TIMER() then
consolidate compatible states
Figure 5: update representation(s, j)
Figure 5 outlines the feature extraction
algorithm, implemented by the function
if (all actions are reliable from s1, and
all actions are reliable from s2, and
compatible(s1, s2) = no)
then
return yes
else
return no
Figure 6: should split(s1, s2)
update representation(s, j). The timer
FE TIMER() causes this function to be invoked at
regular intervals, allowing time for the action values
to settle between changes to the representation (see
Figure 2). The function reliable prototype(j)
tests whether Q(j, b) has been updated at least
MIN UPDATES times for every action b; this
is a stricter test than reliable source(j),
which guards the action value update in the top
level of the algorithm (Figure 1). The function
compatible(s1, s2) applies the state compatibility
criterion given in Definition 9, taking the value of
δ = ǫ.
The basic idea is this: when investigating surpris-
ing states, if the current state appears to be incom-
patible with its classification because of a policy or
value difference that results in significant lost reward,
then add the state as the seed of a new state-space
category. Occasionally, consider whether the repre-
sentation may be simplified by merging compatible
regions, and whether merged regions ought to stay
merged.
3.4 Methodology
How should we test an algorithm for on-line feature
extraction? We want to know whether the algorithm
produces high quality representations for the agent’s
task. A common test is to simply evaluate the
performance of an agent that uses the algorithm to
construct its representation for the task as it goes
about learning the task. Although this technique
is often seen in the literature, good performance
in the task does not necessarily indicate a high
quality representation; evaluating a representation is
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different from simply evaluating performance.
Several other criteria may help evaluate the quality
of the representation. If the representation contains
a small number of features, that may be taken as
evidence of cognitive economy, provided that those
features allow the agent to make the necessary dis-
tinctions in its task. If the representation is reusable
by other agents, that is evidence that it captures
important features of the task, rather than artifacts
of a particular training regimen. If the representation
allows good performance from a variety of starting
points, that may indicate a high level of quality
throughout the relevant parts of the state-space.
Therefore, our evaluation methodology should test
the representation independently of the system which
produced it, and should exercise the representation
over a significant portion of the state-space. Our
quality assessment will be based on the number of
features and the effectiveness of the representation in
the task.
The effectiveness of the representation may be
shown most effectively by a learning curve that plots
task performance against training time for learning
the action values. Learning curves are especially
useful for evaluating representations, because a single
measurement of either learning speed or performance
is likely to mislead. A single measurement of learning
speed tends to favor small representations, which
have fewer parameters to be trained, while a single
measurement of performance tends to favor large
representations, which tend to learn more slowly
but eventually produce superior performance. In
addition, learning curves show whether a represen-
tation reliably supports good performance, or only
results in occasional successes. If a learning curve
is produced, it should be averaged from multiple
experimental runs, in order to minimize system
initialization effects. (Even though the algorithm
may be deterministic, its implementation may rely
on random numbers for action selection when its
preferred action set contains more than one action).
The experiments reported here consisted of two
stages: a representation generation stage and a rep-
resentation testing stage. In the generation stage,
a learning system applied the algorithm described
above, constructing its representation as it learned
the task. The output of this stage is the specification
of a new state-space representation for the task. For
the algorithm to succeed, it must not only learn
to perform well in the task, but must produce a
representation that captures the important features
of the problem, in a form reusable by other agents.
The testing stage consisted of inserting the gener-
ated representation into another reinforcement learn-
ing system and producing learning curves for this new
system. Although the representation is now fixed,
the system must still learn its action values from
scratch, which is why it improves with training. Since
the tester is separate from the agent that produced
the representation, it is able to evaluate different
representations fairly, and it allows us to compare
them in a way that controls for the other aspects
of the reinforcement learning problem. This method
of evaluating learned representations in a separate
system appears to be unique.
To produce a learning curve, the system’s action
values were reset, and the system generated a series
of learning trials. The system’s performance was
evaluated at the ends of trials, but not after every
trial. It was important not to interrupt a running
trial because the task studied here has rewards only
at the ends of trials. At the end of a trial, deciding
whether to generate a performance measurement
depended on a two-part test: the system needed to
have completed either a pre-set number of learning
steps or a pre-set number of trials. This two-part test
insured that the system generated enough data points
both early in the run (when trials are short, so the
number of trials dominates) and late (when trials are
long, and the number of learning steps dominates).
Each performance measurement was the median
score for a batch of trials from a set of random
starting states. (For the puck-on-a-hill task reported
here, the scores were just the trial lengths). The
random starting states were chosen as follows. A
preliminary series of experiments yielded a set of
extreme values for the state-space coordinates; the
tester’s training trials were started at states from the
central third of this observed state-space, and its test
trials were started at states from a slightly smaller
zone—the central quarter of the space. Initializing
trials at random starting states ensures that the
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representation is tested over a significant portion of
the space, providing a more meaningful indication of
the quality of the representation.
4 Case Study: Puck-On-A-Hill
Task
The puck-on-a-hill is a bang-bang control task in
which rewards are seen only at the ends of episodes
that are normally very long (up to 5 million steps)
and include tight cycles. Performance in this task
depends on the adequacy of the state-space repre-
sentation. A Q-learning agent performs poorly with
some seemingly reasonable representations for this
task; but analysis of the task leads to a simple, two-
category representation that is optimal in a sense
described below. Therefore, this is an effective
demonstration task for evaluating algorithms for on-
line feature extraction.
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Figure 7: The puck-on-a-hill task
In the puck-on-a-hill task, the agent controls a puck
which it must learn to push to the left or the right
to keep the puck balanced on the top of a hill. The
agent’s only reinforcement comes when the puck falls
too far down the hill on either side and hits the
containing wall. When that happens, the agent is
given a reward of −1, and the episode ends. This task
has been studied previously in [9] (although with a
slightly different form for the equations of motion)
and in [6]. Figure 7 illustrates the task.
The puck-on-a-hill is similar to the familiar pole-
balancing task [13, 2, 7] but with a two-dimensional
state-space having components for position and ve-
locity only. The simulation details are as follows.
State x, position of puck (meters)
v, velocity of puck (m / sec)
Control f , force on puck (Newtons)
Constraints −2.4 < x < 2.4
f = ±3.0
Equation of hill y = −βx2
Parameters β = 0.3 (hill curvature)
g = 9.8 m / sec2 (grav. accel.)
m = 1.0 kg (mass of puck)
∆ = 0.02 sec,
(sampling interval)
Positive x represents a position on the right side
of the hill. The corresponding angle of the cart with
the hill is given by θ, where positive θ represents a
position on the left side of the hill. Positive f pushes
the puck toward the right.
The equations of motion are as follows.
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + ∆v(t)
v(t+ 1) = v(t) + ∆
(f(t)−mg sin θ(t)) cos θ(t)
m
θ(t) = arctan(−2βx(t))
4.1 Analysis
Some analysis of the task will help us understand
what makes for a good representation. The puck’s
acceleration is determined by its thrusters and the
downward pull of gravity. Near the center of the hill,
the thrusters dominate the force of gravity: the puck
can push itself back to the crest of the hill as long as
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its prior velocity is not too large. Away from the
center, the hill’s slope becomes increasingly steep,
so that gravity overwhelms the contribution of the
puck’s thrusters. Therefore, once the puck has fallen
too far down the hill, it loses the ability to climb back
up, and fails shortly after.
Just where this “point of no return” lies depends
on the puck’s velocity. From the equations of motion,
we see that the acceleration on the puck is zero when
f(t) = mg sin θ(t)
f
mg
= sin arctan(−2βx)
tan arcsin f
mg
−2β
= x
Substituting the values of the parameters, f =
±3.0 Newtons, g = 9.8 m/s2, β = 0.3,m = 1.0 kg,
we have
x =
tan arcsin ±3.0(1.0)(9.8)
(−2)(0.3)
.
= ±0.54
At this point, a puck with zero velocity can hold its
position on the hill; if we place a stationary puck
farther out, it cannot avoid falling down the hill. On
the other hand, if the puck is already moving up the
hill, its existing velocity may be sufficient to carry it
back into the controllable region, even starting from
a point farther down the hill. Therefore, the “point
of no return” lies farther down the hill with higher
puck velocities.
The agent must keep the puck within the region
where its thrusters are effective in controlling the
puck. We will call these states controllable states,
and we will call the states that are past a “point-
of-no-return” doomed states. Figure 8 shows the
controllable states, which form a band falling roughly
diagonally through the middle of the state-space.
This figure was produced by running puck experi-
ments at each point of a very fine grid. (Resolution
was 0.01 in both x and v). The remaining states are
all doomed states, from which the puck cannot avoid
falling down the hill and hitting a wall, no matter
what actions it takes.
Figure 8: Controllable states: states outside this
band result in failure.
Since hitting a wall is the only source of rein-
forcement in this task, the best possible return is
0, obtained by a policy that keeps the puck within
the controllable zone. Any policy that does so is
therefore an optimal policy for this task. If pushing
right from a controllable state sc results in a doomed
state, then we may classify sc as a “must-push-
left” state. Similarly, if pushing left results in a
doomed state, we may classify sc as a “must-push-
right” state. If both left and right lead to other
controllable states, we may classify sc as a “don’t
care” state. The critical states are the must-push-
right and must-push-left states, where the agent’s
next action determines whether it succeeds in the
task. These states are on the edges of the controllable
zone; the states in the middle of the controllable zone
are don’t-care states because neither action will push
the puck past the boundary of the zone. Figure 9
shows the critical states: the must-push-left states
make up the top curve, and the must-push-right
states make up the bottom curve. These plots were
determined by testing each controllable state found in
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the earlier simulation, evaluating the controllability
of the states which result after a single push to the
left or right.
Figure 9: An ideal representation: must-push-left
states (top curve) and must-push-right states (bot-
tom curve) are separated by the diagonal line.
This analysis shows that simply pushing toward
the center of the hill is not an optimal policy. For
example, if the puck is moving fast enough toward
the right, it may need to push to the left, even when
it is already on the left side of the hill. Otherwise,
it may be unable to slow down on the other side
and avoid hitting the right wall. Any policy that
pushes to the left in the must-push-left states (the
top curve in Figure 9) and pushes to the right in
the must-push-right states (the bottom curve) is an
optimal policy. Therefore, any representation that
separates these two classes of states will be adequate
for learning an optimal policy. For example, we
can simply bisect the controllable zone by the line
v = −1.7615x, (Figure 9). Since this representation
cleanly separates the must-push-right states from the
must-push-left states, it allows the system to learn
an optimal policy. In addition, this is one of the
simplest possible representations that preserves the
necessary distinction. Therefore, this diagonal-split
representation is a useful benchmark for evaluating
other representations.
4.2 Results
The results compare the performance of a test system
under different state-space representations. Each
representation was evaluated by inserting it into the
test system and generating a series of 10 learning
curves, which were then averaged. The learning
curves plot performance against the number of train-
ing steps experienced by the test system. Each
performance score is the median trial length for a
batch of 50 trials conducted with learning turned
off. The test trials were stopped if they reached
5,000,000 steps. After 50,000 steps of training, the
diagonal-split representation and the learned repre-
sentation both attained averaged performance scores
of 5,000,000 steps.
4.2.1 Generated representations
Starting from scratch, the system generated a rep-
resentation consisting of 24 prototype states, shown
in Figure 10. Although the prototypes have a
slightly asymmetric layout, their placement allows
the system to easily identify points that are closer
to the “must-push-right” boundary than the “must-
push-left” boundary, and vice versa. The system
adds prototypes from states that it visits, sometimes
in the later stages of a failing trial. The reason
that the system kept generating points farther out
from the center is most likely that it learned a more
negative state value, V 1(s), for states closer to failure
points. Although this value difference turned out to
be unimportant in the puck task, there exist other
tasks where it would have been a critical distinction.
In another experiment, the system was seeded
with a representation consisting of the two (x, v)-
space points (0.2680, 0.6200) and (-0.2680, -0.6200).
These points are on either side of the controllable
zone; although the line connecting them is not
quite perpendicular to the line of the diagonal-split
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Figure 10: Representation constructed automatically,
from scratch (24 categories).
representation described earlier, these two points
were thought to be sufficient to distinguish must-
push-left points from must-push-right points. The
objective of this second experiment was to verify that
the state compatibility criteria do not lead to the
generation of unnecessary states. This was confirmed
by the resulting representation, which simply added
two states at the usual failure points of the task.
Figure 11 shows the representation. The learning
process which produced it required 207 trials, with
the last trial continuing for over 100 million steps.
4.2.2 Control representations
The results compare the performance of the 24-
category generated representation with the perfor-
mance of four other representations: the diagonal-
split representation described above, a uniform 10×
10 grid partitioning, a representation inspired by
Variable Resolution Dynamic Programming [14], and
a representation designed to maintain controllability
[9].
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Figure 11: Representation constructed from a good
seed representation.
Variable Resolution Dynamic Programming
(VRDP) produces a partitioning of the state-space
with the highest resolution at states visited during
experimental trials. Away from these experimental
trajectories, resolution falls off gradually according
to a constraint on neighboring regions. The
experimental trials are “mental practice sessions”
conducted according to an internal model being
learned by the agent. For the studies reported here,
the representation was constructed from two trials
using the puck task environment: an initial trial in
which the agent always pushed to the right, and
a successful trial in which the agent succeeded in
keeping the puck in the center of the hill for over
100,000 steps. (The successful trial was taken from a
system with the uniform 10 × 10 partitioning of the
space). Because VRDP initializes the representation
to a single box, the initial trial consisted of selecting
the same action repeatedly (since the policy for
all states is the policy of that single box). When
the representation was fine enough to allow good
performance, mental practice sessions would focus
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on the states seen in the successful trial. Therefore,
VRDP would be likely to visit the same points in
mental practice sessions which were visited in the
two experimental trials—and most likely, additional
points as the representation was being learned and
performance was still improving. Therefore, this
representation is probably an idealized version of the
application of VRDP to the puck task. As in [14],
the highest resolution of each state-space coordinate
was found by performing six binary splits of that
coordinate. Taking the state-space dimensions
to be [−2.4, 2.4] × [−5.5, 5.5], this resulted in the
smallest distinctions being ∆x = 4.8/64 = 0.075 and
∆v = 11.0/64 = 0.171875. Figure 12 illustrates the
resulting representation.
Figure 12: A representation inspired by Variable
Resolution Dynamic Programming.
Unfortunately, this representation performed
poorly, attaining a maximum averaged performance
score of 2215 steps. (Both the diagonal-split repre-
sentation and the generated representation achieved
averaged scores of 5,000,000 steps). One reason for
this poor performance may be that the partitioning
is very fine along the path from the origin to the
Figure 13: Enhanced VRDP representation.
failure point of the first trial. As a result, reward
from a failure must pass through a very long series
of intermediate boxes before it reaches the critical
states where the agent can actually control the puck.
To test this explanation, I made a second VRDP-
inspired representation, shown in Figure 13. Al-
though this representation does not entirely observe
the constraint on neighboring regions, it removes
most of the boxes resulting from the initial failed
trial. Since this representation performed much bet-
ter than the original, it replaces the original VRDP
representation in the comparison plots which follow.
The other representation, shown in Figure 14, was
taken from [9]. This representation attempts to limit
the agent’s loss of controllability, according to an
off-line analysis computed in terms of a model of
the task: First, compute the worst-case deviations
between possible trajectories of the agent that start
from different states; then divide the state-space into
regions small enough that when this deviation is
integrated over all pairs of states in a region, the
resulting controllability error is less than a tolerance.
This representation was part of an Adaptive Heuristic
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Critic system [3] which learned to balance the puck
for over 10,000 steps, after an average of 13 trials
and 2000 training steps. Since [9] assumed that trials
always start at (0, 0), the experiments reported here
may have been a more severe test of this representa-
tion than the original study, because my test system
starts trials at randomly-chosen starting points.
Figure 14: Representation designed to limit the loss
of controllability (from [9]).
4.2.3 Learning curves
Figure 15 plots the performance for the original
VRDP representation (top curve) and the control-
lability quantization (bottom curve). Note that the
performance scores are all under 2500. Figure 16
shows the averaged curves for the remaining repre-
sentations. From the top, these are the diagonal-
split representation, the representation generated by
the learning system, the uniform 10 × 10 grid, and
the enhanced VRDP representation. The number of
categories for these representations are, respectively,
2, 24, 100, and 117.
These results illustrate several points. First,
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Figure 15: Averaged performance curves for the
original VRDP representation and the controllability
quantization.
visited or frequently-seen states are not necessar-
ily important ones. Second, irrelevant state-space
distinctions can hinder learning, as in the original
VRDP representation. Third, the important areas of
the space are those where the agent’s decision makes
a critical difference in performing the task. The
representations that made the relevant distinctions
(must-push-left versus must-push-right states) in the
simplest way resulted in the most efficient learning.
The cognitive economy approach resulted in a
system that was able to automatically construct a
good representation from scratch. The representation
it constructed had a small number of categories
(24), and proved effective in the task. When given
an effective seed representation, the system made
minimal additions, indicating an ability to discern
relevant distinctions.
5 Discussion and related work
5.1 Assumptions
The system presented in this paper makes several
assumptions. First, the criteria for policy distinctions
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Figure 16: Averaged performance curves for the four
best representations.
assume that the agent’s action is chosen from a
discrete set of actions. Therefore, the preferred action
set is also discrete. Tasks with continuous-valued
action choices will require criteria that consider how
the range of action affects the overall reward.
The active system explores its state-space at the
ends of trials, which presupposes that the agent’s
task is episodic. Non-episodic tasks can sometimes be
made episodic by choosing certain states as terminal
states; alternatively, the system could simply conduct
its explorations at regular intervals.
A more serious limitation is that some real-world
tasks cannot allow the controller to reset the system
state at will (although this is no problem for any task
which is solved through simulation). As discussed
below, the system can be implemented in non-active
versions that would handle such tasks.
The system also depends on the task not being
too stochastic. Otherwise, a “surprising” criterion
would need to be more sophisticated than the one
presented here, taking into account trends and av-
erages over very many instances. The decreasing
learning rate used in the active investigations helps
somewhat, since the learning rate 1/Updates(j, a)
causes the updated value to be the average of all the
instances seen. This is important when the state-
space regions are too coarse, since the action values
may appear stochastic even in a deterministic task,
simply because they really belong to different kinds
of states which get updated together.
5.2 Nearest-neighbor representation
Nearest-neighbor state-abstraction allowed the sys-
tem to split regions by simply adding new proto-
type states. Like ART [5], this strategy adds a
new category for the current observation if its best
classification is a poor match. Compared to the KD-
Tree approach of segmenting the space into hierar-
chical boxes [16, 18], the nearest-neighbor approach
may represent higher-dimensional state-spaces more
efficiently because a few prototypes may still suffice
for broad areas of similar states, instead of needing to
populate a set of state-space “boxes” whose number
grows exponentially with the dimensions of the state-
space. A drawback to the nearest-neighbor approach
is that it requires a sophisticated implementation to
work efficiently when the number of prototypes grows
large.
5.3 Active learning
The active strategy was a natural choice for gen-
erating action-value profiles for a state, because it
provides the values of all actions from the state at
the same time. This is important because the values
are changing as the agent is learning the task. Even
if two actions lead to the same resulting state, the
agent might mistakenly believe them to have different
values if the values were computed at different times.
Assessing a state’s preferred action requires knowing
the values of all the actions from that state.
The active state investigation strategy is still a
form of Q-learning, since Q-learning does not specify
how the value backups must be distributed among
different state-action pairs—only that they continue
to be sampled. By continuing to push randomly-
chosen states onto the stack, the algorithm ensures
that values continue to be sampled. Given a static
task, a fixed, “lookup table” representation, and a
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learning rate that decreases appropriately, the con-
vergence guarantees for Q-learning would therefore
extend to the active strategy [22]. (Such guarantees
are much less likely to be found for a system which
generates its representation online, though, which is
the main contribution of this paper).
Active reinforcement learning may learn more ef-
ficiently because it eliminates action value backups
away from the “frontier” of learned states; this is the
subject of future research. This idea has also been ex-
plored by others. For example, ROUT [4] generated
Monte Carlo simulations of states on the frontier, and
thus worked backwards from the terminal states to
beginning states. One significant difference is that
ROUT required the task to be acyclic, and once
states were learned, they could not be re-investigated.
The present strategy is more robust, since the use of
a replacing stack allows it to focus on the frontier
while reinvestigating states as needed to learn the
representation, or to investigate paths which prove
cyclic (as in the puck task). Other research has
explored the use of an oracle that provides the results
of a state transition [12]. Just as in the active strat-
egy presented here, the system is allowed to choose
particular state-action combinations to investigate;
the oracle simply provides the resulting state and
reward for the transition.
5.4 Non-active approaches
There are also non-active strategies for im-
plementing these ideas. One alternative is
to adopt a more stringent test for surprising
states (using reliable prototype() instead of
reliable source(), see Section 3.3); then immedi-
ately add any state thus selected as a new prototype
for a region, instead of first exploring states through
active investigations. In the end, one can only decide
to split regions by first making tentative splits and
exploring their effectiveness. The current system
does this when it assesses the compatibility of a
state with its primary prototype, since it is making a
hypothetical separation between those two states in
order to see if the region should be split. Splitting
on the basis of the surprising test would make a less
tentative initial separation of the states, but the algo-
rithm’s state consolidation procedure could prevent
the system from accumulating unneeded regions.
Another promising approach is to replace the or-
acle or active state investigation with an internal
model that the agent learns along with the task.
It can save every state transition it experiences as
an (s, a, r, s′) tuple which is stored with the nearest-
neighbor prototype state. These could be reorganized
as regions are merged or detached, and the tuples
could be reassigned when new prototypes are added.
In this way, the agent would construct an increasingly
accurate model of its world, and the agent could per-
form investigations by querying this model instead of
by requesting that the environment reset the system
state for actual trials in the world. This would also
remove the episodic task limitation, since the agent
could conduct investigations internally, whenever it
wished. This approach has much in common with
Prioritized Sweeping [15], which uses a priority queue
to select states for re-examination: states whose
values have significantly changed, as well as states
which are predicted to lead to them. The replacing-
stack performs a similar function by giving priority
to surprising states, in order of recency. The states
leading to those states are often the next states to be
considered surprising, leading them to be investigated
as well—unless the change in values did not make a
value or policy distinction. DYNA [20] also conducts
internal experiments of this sort, although the state-
action pairs are either chosen randomly or given a pri-
ority based on how long ago they were last updated.
The other difference, of course, is that DYNA and
Prioritized Sweeping assume a fixed representation.
5.5 State compatibility
The state compatibility criteria presented in Defi-
nition 9 are similar to those developed by others.
For example, [17] acknowledges that “a good ap-
proximation of the value function at some areas is
not needed if this does not have any impact on the
quality of the controller,” (p. 292). Their splitting
criteria split cells when doing so is most likely to
increase the accuracy of the value function where
there is a transition in the optimal control. Some
of their state-splitting rules include local criteria
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for making policy and value distinctions; however,
their approach targets a slightly different research
problem. Their method requires an existing model
of the dynamics and reinforcement function for the
task, instead of allowing online learning of an un-
known task by experience. [18] presents similar ideas
of state-space compatibility, focusing on decision
boundaries and policy distinctions, and generating
a KD-Tree representation of the state-space as the
system learns the task. Although these compatibility
criteria are similar to the definitions given here, the
criteria given in this paper arise out of an analysis
of representational adequacy based on the idea of
incremental regret. This analysis both links the
discussion to what we know about cognitive economy,
and provides an objective framework for evaluating
compatibility criteria.
6 Conclusions
Criteria for representational adequacy may indicate
relevant training examples by flagging “surprising”
states, leading the agent to focus its efforts where
they will be most useful. State compatibility criteria
allow the agent to split and merge regions according
to distinctions that are relevant to the task at hand.
Developing representations that focus on relevant
distinctions is one of the abilities needed by rein-
forcement learning agents that learn complex tasks
in unknown domains. The criteria presented here
are not ad hoc; they are derived from a definition
of learnability that specifies the maximum amount of
lost reward we will accept due to errors of represen-
tation.
The criteria for representational adequacy and
state compatibility apply to any general reinforce-
ment learning task in which the agent learns to
predict the long-term reward that results from taking
particular actions from particular states. The exper-
imental results indicate that these ideas are useful
and may be applied successfully to real problems.
The system presented here was able to learn better
representations for the puck task than those sup-
plied by other, well-known methods. In addition,
the ideas presented here may allow reinforcement
learning to scale to more complex tasks, because
they simplify the task in three important ways:
cognitive economy allows the agent to generalize over
its state-space where appropriate, active state inves-
tigations allow the agent to focus on the frontier and
avoid useless action-value backups, and the nearest-
neighbor representation allows volumes of state-space
with “smooth” action values to be represented more
sparsely. These are promising directions for future
research.
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